Companion YouTube video: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=MIvUZnAdXwk
A Spanish civil servant in Cadiz, Joaquin Garcia, was due to receive an award for his twenty years of ongoing service and commitment to the Municipal Water Board. Attempting to give him his well-deserved medal, however, it was suddenly perceived that his desk had been totally unoccupied for at least six years, despite receiving a salary. This incident was widely reported in the British media, and was perhaps used as a scapegoat for many key things in the UK’s Brexitty imaginations. It was also circulated in the market-dominated English speaking media, where it became a quaint story about something dark and sinister. That it is only in the idle and hyper-bureaucratic European Union, maybe, where this type of skiving tomfoolery would be tolerated and unrecognised for so long. That the Civil Service in many European countries is deeply inefficient, and this would never be tolerated in a utopian free market economy where lots of different types of water are sold to us by private contractors. He is a pantomime villain on a much more sinister website called HR Morning – where all the genuinely villainous HR professionals gather, like Macbeth’s witches – in which his work-shy attitude is scorned by these eldritch monsters from the deep. (For context, another article on the website is ‘5 times it’s ok to fire an employee on FMLA leave.) “He was – check this out – slated to receive an award for two decades of ‘loyal service’.” (https://www.hrmorning.com/now-this-is-what-youd-call-an-employee-engagement-problem/)
A man like Joaquin Garcia is indeed one of the greatest villains in a culture where work is not really a set of obviously productive and meaningful tasks any more – like digging holes, cutting furzes or escorting billionaires – it is a sacred duty, and pretty much the only sacred duty that is meaningfully universal. People who shirk this sacred duty are blights to be quashed by the Machine. Work might be boring or even obviously meaningless, particularly in the context of so-called white-collar jobs, but we must respect it as a sacred ritual that must still consume all the time that we have been assigned on this earth. Work is now usually conceived in terms of the hours it involves rather than the projects that it entails – the question I have always been asked at work in England is not “what are you planning to do today?” but “what time are you on ’til?” Work is a God to worship. When so many are looking for a cushy job, or have to claim unemployment benefits in which they are forced by the DWP to maintain an aggressive timetable of looking for work, a man like Joaquin – who apparently abuses the privilege he has been given and scorns his probably comfortable duties in the Civil Service – is unthinkable.
In ‘Bullshit Jobs’ by David Graeber, we find a totally different take on this issue. Graeber points out that the case of Garcia is extremely common in the modern work-place: only that he went to different measures to most, but measures that were totally reasonable. Garcia was extremely good at his job, and when he started working for the Municipal Water Board he was an extremely effective and prolific civil servant. However, the people who supervised him were suspicious of his far-left politics – which, of course, had no bearing whatsoever on his work at the Municipal Water Board. For this and perhaps other reasons, they stopped delegating him any duties at all, despite his desire for duties and the fact that he specifically requested them on a number of occasions. Thus, he was forced into a situation that will be very familiar to a lot of ‘workers’. He had to sit at a desk all day, doing nothing but pretending to be busy, while people looked over his shoulder and expected him to inexplicably be doing things of importance. He might as well have read books or spent all that time planting a permaculture garden, but he was forced into a kind of active inertia which, in itself, is psychological turmoil. Perhaps as if Sisyphus was staring at the boulder, pretending to push it, as ancient Greek mythological bureaucrats stared for eternity. Instead of endure this obvious indignity, which he repeatedly protested, he decided to stop coming into work and spend his time working – for example, reading philosophy.
Graeber uses a large amount of qualitative and quantitative data to prove a very basic thesis: that many people have utterly pointless jobs, which he eloquently terms ‘bullshit jobs’. Detailing the example of a young man who works as the subcontractor of a subcontractor of a subcontractor for the German military, Graeber gives the following account of what a so-called ‘Bullshit Job’ entails:
This I consider the defining feature of a bullshit job: one so completely pointless that even the person who has to perform it every day cannot convince himself there’s a good reason for him to be doing it. He might not be able to admit this to his coworkers—often there are very good reasons not to do so. But he is convinced the job is pointless nonetheless.
He spoke to people all over the world who claim to have totally pointless jobs that many of them had left due to the eventual realisation that they were utter bullshit. He spoke to people who claimed their job was to answer e-mails and receive telephone calls but that most days they did not have any to answer. He spoke to people who mentioned having to carry out totally pointless tasks that they knew they could write programs to carry out, but stay because it is the only way they can identify of having a respectable enough salary to buy things. He cited examples of people who work in a needlessly complicated chain that could be effortlessly simplified. For example, the kind of people discussed above who work for a contractor of a contractor of a contractor – and that none of these contractors have any reason to exist, they are merely self-perpetuating entities that create imaginary work out of thin air.
This is not just in the public sector. In fact, in the private sector, there is still a huge demand for individuals to sit around and do nothing, and it is ridiculous to deny this essential reality. He classifies different types of ‘bullshit jobs’, what they entail and the reasons they have for existing. Flunkies, for example, make their pay-masters look more powerful: they occupy desks to make an organisation look more threatening or serious by the amount of desks it has occupied. This happens a great deal, for example, in investment banks, where Graeber points out that a huge amount of the work supposedly carried out could be easily automated. He cites the assessment of a programmer employed to carry out the review of one particular bank, who estimated that 80% of a private bank’s 60,000 staff have jobs that could have been automated. This is a huge number of people – what are they all doing? Why do they all go to work, day in and day out? Before you suggest that they must all do something that is of direct benefit to society, bear in mind that there have been times when people have stopped banking en masse and things have been largely fine. As early as 1970, bankers in Ireland went on a six-month strike, and there was very little overall effect on the Irish economy. To put this into context, Graeber’s book includes an analysis of the net worth of certain professions as carried out by a 2017 study by several US economists. It was somehow discerned that for every precise $1 that bankers are given, they are decreasing $1.50 worth from the overall welfare of society.
Do they all realise they have completely pointless jobs? Keynes predicted mass technological unemployment in the 1930s as economies move to the point of being able to automate tasks at an unprecedented rate, and he predicted it soon. Technological unemployment, of course, is when all productive processes become so mechanised that the work-force decreases dramatically. As Graeber notes, we have been experiencing a kind of mass unemployment for nearly a century. We hear constant predictions about how robots will nab 47% of jobs by 2050 and what have you, and yet Graeber argues that we have reached the pinnacle of automation already:
Automation did, in fact, lead to mass unemployment. We have simply stopped the gap by adding dummy jobs that are effectively made up.
It is the professional and managerial sector – rather than any other sector like retail and manufacturing – that has seen such an explosion of jobs in the Western world, and in which jobs have proliferated. It is unfair to say that many managers and finance workers don’t work – yet it is sure that many spend only half an hour or an hour a day on their actual duties. Graeber points out that we could very easily institute a three-day working week with absolutely zero effect on our dear and worshipful ‘economy’. Yet something has made the idea of ‘work’ last well past its sell-by date, and it is not our lust for respectable salaries. Graeber discusses how work emerged as a quasi-religious ideal in Western Europe.
Work—and specifically, paid labor under the eye of a master—had traditionally been the means by which such adolescents learned how to be proper, disciplined, self-contained adults.
In other words, the need for a ‘work ethic’ and a related ‘working week’ was an ingenious way in which everyone, including the middle class, were kept out of trouble. The aristocracy, of course, were free to hunt, write sonnets and engage in indulge demented sexual fantasies before their inevitable religious conversions. This is especially the case in the UK, where, particularly in the nineteenth century, the working week became more brutal and religion began to decline. Work became the only way in which people reliably interacted with each other after compulsory church attendance declined. Remember that Church’s function was not just the consumption of the body of the Anointed One but it was also the way in which people met each other, checked up on each other and gossiped about each other. Before the nineteenth century, people largely did not go to ‘workplaces’ – they worked from home as farmers or slaved over their particular craft. A huge majority of the population worked in agriculture, which does not involve the ritual of a frenetic commute on the Tube with a gingerbread latté. About a quarter of people in the UK worked in agriculture in 1801, according to data collected in An Industrial History of Modern Britain. Now, the World Bank estimates that about 1% of people in the UK work in agriculture.
I think it’s easy to speculate on what happened, and I think this is something Graeber only touches on, but it leads to an interpretation of my own. In the UK and much of the industrialised world, after the Industrial Revolution, work became the religion of society – the way in which you could make friends, formed social networks as well as the structure and discipline which kept one living an ordered life. In the UK, we do not have instituted religious holidays or carnivals – they began to peter out in the nineteenth century with the Industrial Revolution’s increasing demands on the populace. Rather than religious affiliation – there were Catholic villages and Quaker villages – a particular textile mill or factory became the religious glue (religio – I bind) which held a town together and gave it the permanence and ritual spaces to encourage people to actually talk to each other. It is a well-known fact that people will seldom talk to each other in a consistent way unless they are coerced. After rapid industrialisation and automation, there became less and less for anybody to do but still predominantly industrial institutions.
Work was such a religious and sacred duty – the creation of jobs became akin to the saving of souls, and the Conservative Party or Labour Party of whatever country you live in now tout how they will create jobs as their sacred mantra. Despite the fact that there is not enough to do any more, work is our religion, and perhaps a more difficult religion to wean ourselves off than Graeber realises. Without work, we have no reason for communion, no identity, no structure or discipline to our days, despite the fact that we don’t necessarily do anything there. I remember talking to a friend, a veritable anarchist, somebody who enjoys tinkering around with electronics and has a healthy disbelief in the credibility of the institutions of society. He said he was looking forward to work because he was incapable of managing his own time and he wanted somebody else to dictate that he had to be somewhere and do something.
Thus, despite widespread feelings of boredom, lassitude and alienation, we still feel some psychological need for ‘work’ as an ordering principle for our lives, separated of course from the more old-fashioned notion of doing useful things with our time. This is perhaps the chief limitation of Graeber’s analysis: it is going to be a big existential struggle to convince humanity of the folly of ‘work’. The policy that Graeber most suggests is a universal basic income, in which everyone is paid a basic amount of money without any obligation to find one of the entirely infernal bullshit jobs that are lamented by Graeber. This policy would rectify a situation in which one of the most meaningful things you can do is stay at home, yet first we need to rediscover ways to hold society together that aren’t going to ‘work’ every day. There could also be systematic support for those who choose to research, conduct artistic projects or study obstetric gymnaesology from home in a future economy in which work is at least no longer a permanent imperative.
Bullshit Jobs, David Graeber. Rating: Axon
(Much of the incidental symbolism for this blog-post was suggested by Amadeus Harte and Jack Smithies)